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Summary
The paper is about objectifi cation in and of social work. 
Drawing on a decade-long cooperation with a Copen-
hagen social workers network focused in the organiza-
tion Wild Learning, and starting from an Internet essay 
this organization has provided, the problems with objec-
tifying social work are discussed. Viewed as basically 
a wholistic subjectifi cation, social work cannot easily 
be endowed with objectivity in the form of scientifi c 
standards, and the objects representing it are often like 
novels, uniqueness mass-produced; they can be said to 
ideologically confi rm rather than scientifi cally model 
its activities and communities. The approach to objec-
tifi cation must dig a level deeper. It is considered how 
objectifi cations in social work – and the Internet essay 
is taken as example – can be approached critically as 
ideological objectifi cations and at the same time, in the 
cultural-historical tradition, as prototypes with some 
scope of relevance.
“18.5.2002
About hash – no 3
Experience and opinions concerning hash
Girl, 16 years
The fi rst time I tried to smoke hash myself, I 
was 12. The fi rst couple of times I smoked, I 
was with friends who were used to smoking. 
At fi rst, I actually didn’t like being stoned, 
so I don’t know why I went on. Today, I wish 
I’d never started, because now I like it, and I 
smoke every day. I began smoking daily when 
I’d just turned 16. It started in the summer holi-
day, when we would hang out with a group of 
boys who smoked daily. Not that I blame them; 
only it became ordinary to smoke daily when 
one was with them. I don’t go out with those 
boys anymore, but I still smoke daily. In some 
ways I’d like to stop smoking, in other ways I 
wouldn’t. I’d like to stop because I feel it makes 
me stupid and forgetful. The reason why I won’t 
stop is that I like to smoke and be stoned.
Girl 16 years”
These words are available to the (Danish-read-
ing) global public at the website of the Copen-
hagen social work development network Wild 
Learning1. There are a handful of reasons to 
quote them here, at the opening of a paper 
about objectifi cation in social work.
First, the organizing of the writing and read-
ing is directly part of the performance of a 
particular local instance of social work. The 
words anyone can see on his screen, then, are 
Morten Nissen
Wild Objectifi cation: 
Social Work As Object
1   16.12.2003: http://www.vildelaereprocesser.dk/kronik/
kroniktekst.php3?id=95 – translated from the Danish 
by MN
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in a certain way a direct sample, congealed as 
an objectifi cation of that social work.
Second, even as a form of objectifi cation, 
it is quite far from any “objectivity” in the 
sense of authorized truth or method – it is the 
bold statement of a distinctively subjective and 
quite heterogeneous experience and opinion on 
the part of the girl, and the social workers have 
only a personal experience as their background 
for arranging it, just as they have no idea where 
it will lead them.
Third, it deals with diversity in the fashion-
able form of merely displaying it, recogniz-
ing what could have also been tabooed or stig-
matized as deviant, accepting it as part of this 
multiple world we’re in, and thus leaving com-
pletely open the question of whether the devi-
ant should be normalized, or, rather, normativ-
ity should be defi ed, or indeed, what might be 
an alternative to this predicament altogether.
Fourth, this obvious lack of commitment 
provides an interesting tension to the disci-
pline, not only of traditional social work, of 
drug treatment programs, or of parents and 
other authorities who attempt to sanction hash 
as illegal, but also that of the website itself as 
an ideological form, and of the subjectivities 
and the communities it endorses.
Fifth, it matches the discipline of practice 
research as it is directly a reference which I’ve 
agreed with my social worker partners in Wild 
Learning to work on transforming.
These reasons make sense because this 
paper is about the objectifi cation of social 
work as unique but prototypical practices of 
some relevance.
I shall return to the website, the quote, and 
those points about it, below. But fi rst, I need 
to introduce Wild Learning in more general 
terms.
Wild Learning
For more than a decade, the social workers of 
the network which currently gathers around the 
organization called Wild Learning have been 
recognized as a kind of bare-foot development 
agents in the fi elds of socially excluded and 
drug misusing youth in Copenhagen. Like so 
many other contemporary state authorities, 
Copenhagen City attempt to meet the challenge 
of double social exclusion – from ‘normal’ 
school, employment etc. as well as from the 
traditional institutions of social work – with a 
two-pronged approach to development: a mo-
bilization of users and community organizers 
as the allies of central offi cials both attacking 
narrow-minded professionalism.
Wild Learning is a through-and-through 
ad hoc, network organization that grows at 
times and places of trouble in specifi c intia-
tives negotiated between offi cials at different 
levels (sometimes also politicians), profession-
als of different institutions, youngsters – and 
as overall mediators, the Wild Learning social 
workers. Its ‘members’ have varied, but com-
paratively low, levels of formal education, and 
a substantial number are themselves former 
‘street kids’. Memberships, activities and 
carrieers emerge organically from judgments 
and negotiations about unique individuals in 
unique situations in relation to unique project 
ideas. One qualifi es by participating, taking 
responsibility, and making things work.
Nearly all this time, I and a few colleagues 
and students have been engaged in a mixture 
of ethnography and action research partnership 
with those social workers and some offi cials 
(Mørck, 2000; Mørck, 2003; Nissen, 1997; 
Nissen, 1998b; Nissen, 1998a; Nissen & Pe-
dersen, 2000; Nissen, 2002b; Nissen, 2002a; 
Nissen, 2004a; Nissen, 2004b; Nissen, 1999a; 
Nissen, 1999b; Nissen, 2000; Nissen, in press), 
treating the network as a kind of proto-typical 
social practice that embodies, creates, and/or 
tackles issues of subject-formation, marginali-
zation, learning, and method in social work. In 
several series of tape-recorded interviews and 
group discussions (22 and 27, respectively, 
since 1999), social workers were prompted 
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to explain or narrate their ways of working 
(sometimes focused on special themes such 
as power, drugs, or trajectories of learning); 
we have participated in a 3-years sequence 
of monthly 3-4 hours network meetings often 
dedicated to presenting local projects, describ-
ing ways of working, and discussing dilemmas 
and possible solutions, and recorded the dis-
cussions in fi eld-notes; a large body of written 
material has been collected, primarily pam-
phlets, internet texts, internal notes, project 
blueprints, and other “collective” materials 
(rarely fi les on individual youngsters). All the 
while, we as researchers have regularly fed 
back analyses both in informal contacts, in 
the course of interviews etc., in structured 
oral form (e.g. systematic presentations at the 
network meetings), and in writing of various 
kinds, including, and increasingly signifi cant, 
internet texts at the Wild Learning website.
When asked to explain by what methods 
these often young and unskilled persons seem 
able to solve problems in the face of which 
many a well-educated and experienced social 
worker or therapist have surrendered, the very 
concreteness and particularity of the organiza-
tion and its members is often taken to be the 
crucial pedagogical resource. It is not a ques-
tion of being the right kind of person, but of 
being the right person; no method is right – it 
all depends on the situation, so the right situ-
ation has to be created; the turning points are 
accomplished when everything is put at stake 
and rules are broken; and it is when the young-
ster understands himself to be recognized as 
unique that he can break the patterns of social 
exclusion.
Thus, anti-method is a suitable name for 
the method (Nissen, 2004a). Now, it is tempt-
ing, perhaps, to take this paradoxical state of 
affairs as indeed something unequaled, in the 
sense of saying that these social workers have 
discovered a hidden truth of a superior method 
that may now (with the humble assistance of 
researchers such as myself) be spread as good 
news to the profession. The trick, then, and 
the reason why it has been hidden, is the very 
paradox: who would look for anti-method in 
the search of method? But soon, with the Out-
lines on the streets, its very uniqueness will be 
replicated by “wild” social workers in every 
alley and burg, from Kajanin to Capetown.
Or, conversely, it may be tempting to use 
the pervasive singularity as the good reason for 
refusing to take the experience and the appar-
ent succes of Wild Learning into account: it 
all results from a lucky combination of unique 
features of an exceptional situation. Indeed, 
understanding the Wild Learning experience 
does require that one looks to the specifi cs, 
not just of this group of people, but also of a 
decade of turbulent political and administrative 
reorganizations, of the hard work, the strug-
gles, and the eventual success of particular 
groups of offi cials, of the adolescence of the 
fi rst generation of children of immigrants in 
one of Copenhagen’s poor districts, in a time of 
recession followed by post-industrial exclusion 
of the unskilled, and in a climate of increasing 
political polarization, of the reorientation of 
certain political groups etc.
Still, my thesis is that what we are dealing 
with is neither just universal nor just particular, 
but a problematic of some generality which 
makes it suffi ciently interesting to refl ect.
Subject-formation in general 
education and social work
To make this point, let us fi rst, for a mo-
ment, challenge it by diving into another very 
unique situation, quite remote in time, space 
and overall cultural context. One of the few 
classic textbooks on youth work that have 
circulated among some of the social workers 
in Wild Learning is Anton Makarenko’s The 
Road to Life – an Epic of Education, from 
1935 (Makarenko, 2002). The book is a novel 
– even sometimes referred to as a “pedagogic-
al poem” – that reports the establishment, de-
43857_outlines 2004 nr1.indd   75 04-11-2004   15:22:29
76
Morten Nissen • Wild Objectification: Social Work As Object
velopment, and subsequent dissolution of a 
colony for street kids in the Ukraine in the 
1920’s. Makarenko is the leader of the colony, 
the main protagonist, the refl exive narrator, 
and the author. The fundamental approach 
is anti-methodical. The turning point which 
founds the colony is when Makarenko, driven 
to despair, forgets all about rules and regula-
tions and fi rst exposes himself, taking up a 
confl ict for real, physically attacking a boy, 
and then goes on to organize the physical la-
bour that is directly necessary for survival. 
Even while fi ghting famine, violent crime, 
and kulak exploitation, the worst enemies are 
always the pedagogical professionals. A true 
revolutionary humanism expresses itself, ac-
cording to Makarenko, in stepping out of the 
false world of abstract theory and method, 
and engaging with real life issues. It is in the 
collectivity of labour and confl ict that the new 
man of the new society is formed. Makarenko 
describes himself as allied with the boys and 
with the upcoming leaders of the new soci-
ety, against petty bourgeoisie in the form of 
kulaks and in the form of pedagogues. One 
can hardly imagine a more direct and tangible 
interconnection between the formation of the 
individual, the local community, and the new 
society – of the new state, the borders of which 
barely secured.
But why is it, exactly, that Makarenko’s 
poetic narrative of events so far from the Wild 
Learning experience can become somehow a 
useful reference? Perhaps, it may be specu-
lated, it is because his is an early account of an 
“anti-method” which is much later to become 
fashionable? I would suggest, rather, that it is 
because that “anti-method” is itself a deep and 
age-old aspect of pedagogical and social work. 
Allow me a short genealogical detour.
In fact, even though Makarenko hates peda-
gogues, his epic can be read as quite repre-
sentative of a long pedagogical tradition that 
can be characterized as a discourse on for-
mation or general education (Danish: “Dan-
nelse”; German “Bildung”) which emerged 
much earlier with such writers as Rousseau 
and Humboldt. According to Arnd Hofmeisters 
genealogy (Hofmeister, 1998), already two 
centuries ago the problem of the formation 
of subjects was developed, as the problem of 
the self-determined and the general, the cross-
contextual competences that were demanded of 
the citizens of a differentiated society. Char-
acteristic of this Bildungs-discourse was and 
is the idea of a positive relationship between 
human nature as general potentials and the 
needs of a new society (in a new state), a rela-
tion which realizes itself in the citizen’s mas-
tering, but also, and not least, superceding and 
even breaking the old rules and knowledges 
and assuming responsibility for the potentials 
of the “real”, that which lies beyond tradition, 
beyond discourse, the virgin land to be culti-
vated anew2.
In the fi eld of social work, we can also fi nd 
reasons for anti-methodical tendencies. Viewed 
genealogically (Cruikshank, 1999; Donzelot, 
1979; Philp, 1979; Rose, 1999; Stenson, 1993; 
Sunesson, 1981), the “social” refers to society 
as a general object of problematization. In the 
framework of a welfare state generally charac-
terized by a comprehensive intervention by the 
state into family and civil society, social work 
becomes a realization of the humanity of both 
the individual and society. According to Mark 
2  Incidentally, these points are easily recognized in Wild 
Learning if one views the way staff learning is con-
ceived. Probably the best interpretation of the pedago-
gical ethos of Wild Learning is one formulated from 
a situated learning approach (Lave & Wenger, 1991), 
to which the cross-contextuality, the self-determina-
tion, and the deep immanence of learning in practical 
changes, are central. Such an interpretation is done by 
my research colleague in Wild Learning, Line Lerche 
Mørck (Mørck, 2000; Mørck, 2003). Of course, both 
Wild Learning, Lave, Wenger, and Mørck stress, in 
addition, the social aspect and the formation of commu-
nities much more directly than is typical of learning 
practices and theories – thereby approaching a social 
work discourse.
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Philp, social work arises with the recognition 
of the working class as the dealing with the re-
sidual lumpenproletariat that now represented 
the social problem, as the attempt to mediate 
between society and the socially excluded by 
three operations: the formation of singular 
subjects, the integration of objective features 
into this subjectivity, and the speaking on be-
half of it. Social work, thus, is the formation 
of subjects, in connection with the formation 
of a welfare state and its various constituent 
communities. Philp’s main point is that this 
makes it hard to objectify in a scientifi c form 
of knowledge: social work becomes distinc-
tive precisely by negating the objectivity of 
its object.
Social work shares this dilemma result-
ing from the positing subject-formation as its 
object with Bildung, general education. But 
social work’s emphasis on the social, on solv-
ing social problems, or even solving the social 
problem, at least when this is substantiated in 
a political process, in a welfare state, widens 
the scope of concerns.
It means, for one thing, that the issue of 
everyday life enters into the fi eld of social 
work in the broader notion of community rather 
than merely in the form of “conduct of life” 
that appears in educational thinking. Without 
ever realizing its own aspirations of a genuine 
social engineering, social work’s formative ef-
fort again and again steps from the individual 
to the level of some social entity, the vague-
ness of which is characteristic of the concept 
of community.
And, for another, it means that social work 
adds the ‘negative generality’ of health to the 
‘positive generality’ of formation/education. 
Social work is directed at solving social prob-
lems and includes therapeutic discourse as well 
as educational. By virtue of its very general-
ity, social work can put together in one fi eld 
medicine and education; but social work only 
remains itself so long as it does not specialize 
in either: so long as it operates the subjectifi -
cation of welfare state citizens and commu-
nities, rather than cures diseases or teaches 
qualifi cations.
These features add more reasons to be scep-
tical of method and objectivity: the reciprocity 
of formation between individual, community, 
and state means that revising and setting, rather 
than applying, standards becomes a qualifying 
feature in itself. And to specialize in spanning 
the whole range of sciences and professions 
directed at human life means specializing in 
vagueness – when knowledge and intervention 
becomes specifi c, it is no longer really social 
work. Thus, on the one hand, social work tends 
toward an idealistic humanism that remains 
reluctant to identify with its own objectifying 
realizations. On the other hand, the normative 
dimension intrinsic to social work as a form 
of practice tends to appear profanely ideologic-
al to the point of “totalitarianism” because it 
deals with social totalities – no fi xed standards 
(such as those norms derived from biological 
functioning or from specifi c knowledge and 
skills) can defend against (charges of) ideol-
ogy or moralism.
This wholistic and necessarily ideological 
nature of social work is precisely apparent in 
Makarenko. He organizes shooling and ap-
preciates specifi c knowledges, but he devotes 
attention to the overall attitudes, ways of life, 
and responsibility of the children. He deals 
with specifi c problems and malfunctions, but 
always views them as steps in the develop-
ment of his colony. And the way his colony 
is directly part of building the new society, 
writing its mythology, appointing its heroes 
and foes, and demanding its support, is appar-
ent. His crusade against pedagogues is always 
against the superstitions of the old society and 
the attempt to speak for the human beings of 
the new.
The fact that Makarenko’s narrative is situ-
ated so obviously at a time and a place where 
a “new society” meant a “new state” lets us 
notice Mark Philp’s Althusserian backdrop. 
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In Althusser’s theory of “ideological state 
apparatuses”(Althusser, 1994), subjectifi ca-
tion is not only the exercise of a power that 
leads to a conscientious or “ethical” self, but 
also an interpellation, a forming of a unique 
subjectivity in an intersubjective relation of 
identifi cation with a capital S “Subject”: the 
state apparatus, alienated into the shape of 
God. I suggest, following (Højrup, 2003a), that 
we view the state less as an “apparatus” and 
more as a community, a singular unit of living 
culture which inheres subjectivity as it estab-
lishes itself vis-a-vis other states and its subject 
participants, and as it is ideologically defi ned 
as an ideal form which is always contested and 
imperfectly realized. It is from this vantage 
point, then, that interpellation becomes more 
of a mutual process where subjectifi cation is 
always also the reconstitution of community. 
This idea can be put to use in an approach to 
the welfare state as the form of state which not 
only intervenes massively in civil society and 
families, but does this in ways which are both 
productive and self-transforming – by not only 
regulating, but also comprehensively building 
the institutions which become the organized 
venues of communal life, such as kindergar-
tens, schools etc. Social problems, under such 
conditions, can always, at least potentially, be 
turned back against the state as the demand for 
an expansive transformation of the system of 
institutions.
In Wild Learning, this interpretation of so-
cial work is also feasible, even if surely what 
is meant by the building of a new society and 
a new state is, viewed as overall totality, quite 
vague, since in today’s political climate, the 
only clear vision of a reformed welfare state is 
the monster of its neoliberal disintegration. If 
we do accept that the constitutive bond must be 
more or less open at one end (at least) it is not 
diffi cult to view Wild Learning as something 
of an “ideological state apparatus”. Subjecti-
fi cation and humanistic wholism are apparent, 
and the mutuality of formation of subjects and 
communities is present in the practiced idea 
that reorganization of social work institutions 
and building of networks is itself a crucial 
form of social work. This is not only because 
fl exibility allows for user orientation etc., but, 
more crucially, as we shall see below, because 
the objectifi cation in cultural objects that de-
fi ne such fl eeting lower-level communities is 
a vital form of cultural pedagogy.
There is one dimension, though, in which 
the ideological character of Wild Learning 
even at the level of overall social policy is 
quite distinct. This is the discussion of legal 
versus social approaches to the criminal young. 
The past ten years have been a period of legal 
tightenings often connected with the rise of 
xenophobia in Denmark. Both the former ‘third 
way’ social-democrat and the new liberal gov-
ernment have conducted a policy of increasing 
incarceration to demonstrate resolve against 
drugs- or violence-related crimes of immigrant 
boys. The Wild Learning network have been 
quite clear in standing up against xenophobia 
and law-and-order rhetorics, and this is obvi-
ously connected with the ways projects and 
communities defi ne themselves – even at the 
level of the City: “the Copenhagen way” is 
widely known for its emphasis on a street-level 
cooperation which is able to recruit not only 
street kids, but also muslim as well as radical 
socialist constituencies.
Facing the issue of crime, it is perhaps 
less ordinary that Wild Learning have, like 
Makarenko, departed from social work’s tradi-
tonal tendency to pretend an absence of power. 
As Philp describes, social work is born in 
distinction from objectifi cation of the outcast 
through direct exertion of power, like educa-
tion and cure leaving power outside the door as 
a hidden premise. But the general or wholistic 
nature of social work means that this absense 
or invisibility of power is never really insti-
tutionalized like in therapy or schooling. At 
certain points, the ways in which social work 
is itself power come to the surface of the dis-
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course. Operating the bifurcations (Cohen, 
1985) between subjects and non-subjects, so-
cial work is often directly normative even in 
the strong “totalitarian” sense of sanctioning 
deviance and marginalization, and this can-
not be consistently disacknowledged. Social 
work is haunted, as it were, by the spectre of 
power; and the most common reaction to it is 
a critical rejection that is at once self-defi ning 
and self-denying.
One of the points of resurfacing of power 
is the street level. Here, a cooperative social 
approach is quite distinct from a sovereign or 
disciplinary power, but it also still does face the 
challenge of individuals’ or gang’s informal 
power, of the networks of power relations that 
lie beneath what is effectively and formally 
sanctioned by the institutions of legal power 
and of welfare state provisions. Thus, it must 
deal with the problem of „social order“ in its 
undifferentiated germ cell shape. To an extent, 
the social workers in the Wild Learning net-
work have taken up that prototype as a chal-
lenge to social work‘s idealistic self-image.
In the case of drugs, Wild Learning, and 
Copenhagen City in general, represent an at-
tempt to steer clear of both war-on-drugs and 
simple harm reduction policies. This is evi-
denced in the above quoted website text which 
exemplifi es a refusal to demonize the drug 
user, but without, on the other hand, casting 
the drug user as a sensible and pragmatic risk 
calculator. Again here, the approach operates 
the border-line – it places itself in-between tak-
ing the subject for granted and denying it.
But before I discuss the website more close-
ly, I need to discuss the implications of this 
discussion on social work anti-method and 
objectivity.
Objectivity
Obviously, any theoretical refl ection of social 
work needs to transcend the dichotomy of sub-
ject and object in terms of which one precludes 
the other. Objectivity is something which is 
done. And subjectifi cation itself results from 
the dialectics of objectifi cation of the subject 
and the subject’s overcoming of that objectifi -
cation in a reconstituted participation (Nissen, 
2004a; Nissen, 2004b). But the implications 
can be confusing.
Both therapy and scooling can be viewed in 
abstraction from the theme of subjectifi cation, 
as the cure of specifi c malfunctions in organ-
isms, and the reproduction of specifi c qualifi -
cations, respectively. That abstraction misses 
the point, so to speak, in terms of what matters 
in general to health and learning. But it can be 
argued that this abstraction from the essential is 
precisely the key to how subjectifi cation works 
in these institutions. Health and learning be-
comes the responsibility of the subject because 
the practices are organized around a boundary 
objectivity derived from biology and science in 
the shape of pathology and didactics. The con-
cept of a ‘boundary objectivity’, here, is devel-
oped from Star’s concept of ‘boundary object’ 
(Bowker & Star, 1999) to mean an objectivity 
established with a boundary object, an object 
that translates between social worlds by hold-
ing meanings intrinsic to each. One example is 
the “disease” that translates between medical 
practice and illness in everyday life and which 
thus may provide a boundary objectivity to the 
disciplinary aspects of health care.
If social work, by contrast, remains the 
general form where subjectifi cation is directly 
appearing “in itself”, its objectivity becomes 
its temporary self-negation: objectifi cation al-
ways seems to lead away from its essential or 
“authentic” realization, to bring about either 
a relapse into boundary objectivities or a re-
turn to the de-subjectifying objectifi cations 
of power.
One may fear, at this point, that all there is 
left for social work as such, “authentic” social 
work, are fl eeting glimpses of particular sub-
jectivities. But in fact, this is where particular 
objectifi cations in and of unique situations 
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such as those of Makarenko or of Wild Learn-
ing become important. Both built unique, but 
also fairly strong and lasting communities; and 
to both, representational or epistemological 
artifacts played a signifi cant role. Makarenko’s 
book is a novel that discribes a unique situ-
ation and has been printed in thousands of 
copies in many languages. The Wild Learning 
network, as part of which alone our 16-years 
old hash-smoking girl becomes understand-
able, is equally unique, and the girl’s text is 
equally multiplied onto potentially millions of 
computer screens.
Both objects, then, represent the double 
face of what Paul Willis (2000) calls the quasi-
modo cultural commodity, the combination 
of immediate usefulness and fetichism. It is 
implied that social work’s failure to establish 
objectivity also allows market-like forms of 
objectifi cation and distribution to be substi-
tuted for elitism and professional assymmetry, 
‘teaching’ etc.
In both cases, the idea of objectifi cation of 
social work should direct our attention, not 
to whether it represents practice truthfully, or 
whether the practices it represents are truly 
effective, but, more fundamentally, to how 
objects are produced, distributed, and used by 
communities, and not least, how they may be 
“representative” in the more pragmatic “diplo-
matic” sense that they contribute symbolically 
to constituting communities and participants.
Indeed, when rationalist aspirations are dis-
carded – often on a fi rm empirical basis (Goff-
man, 1961; Sunesson, 1981) – the next logical 
step is to regard the objectifi cations which 
“ought to have been” representational in the 
epistemological sense of refl ections, as rituals. 
For instance, the Danish sociologist Dahler-
Larsen (Dahler-Larsen, 2000) found that the 
recent boom in evaluations in the public sector 
could not be explained in a rationalist way, 
since decision makers are unlikely to actually 
follow recommandations or even take fi ndings 
and analyses into account. Instead, he fi nds that 
organizations increasingly defi ne themselves 
in terms of quality management, self-scrutiny, 
targeted intervention etc. Thus, the evaluations 
are rituals which literally make the sense with 
which the organizations and its participants un-
derstand themselves, even if they do not make 
sense in terms of what they say they do.
In a framework of critical psychology, ac-
tivity theory, or, broadly speaking, the epis-
temology of practice derived from dialectical 
Marxism, the ontological question does not 
rule out the pragmatic. The making of sense 
does not preclude the production of meaning, 
and we don’t necessarily, as did Goffman and 
his social constructionist descendants, have to 
bracket ontology in order to analyse symbolic 
interaction. More specifi cally, the problem of 
the object, and the objectivity of social work, 
remain relevant to how social work subjec-
tifi es, no matter with how many “laminations” 
it is “framed” (Goffman, 1986). Let us ap-
proach, then, the problem of our hash-smoking 
Internet girl as an artifact, as a cultural form of 
“the ideal” (Ilyenkov, 1977b) that is produced, 
performed and distributed in social practice, 
but which is that, precisely, because it holds 
real powers in a real world.
The “hash-smoking Internet 
girl, 16 years”, as object
The girl is real. Not only does the girl who 
wrote the text exist, but the casting of her is 
a very real process, and her character and the 
stage on which she performs are artifacts that 
have real effects.
She is even staged as ‘real’, meaning that 
the whole idea of this, from one angle, is to 
demonstrate a rigorous realism in presenting 
the girl as she is, in all her problematic indeci-
siveness. This is presented as the naked truth of 
an intoxicated autobiography (Valverde, 2002; 
see also Plant, 1999) the message is that even if 
we may not like it, deal with it we must.
Deal with it, that is, not as we would have 
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dealt with samples of some disorder in a tex-
book or lecture in psychiatry. When a psy-
chiatric patient is used to display the tissue 
of disease, what is problematic is that she is 
reduced to a non-subject, to the mere object 
of medicine, as contrasted to our humanistic 
assumption that behind it is hidden a suffering 
subject. The corresponding Internet text format 
would probably be if the girl’s text were sur-
rounded by expert interpretations that point to 
signs in the text of dependency or madness or 
of the effects of the drug on the brain.
That tradition of objectifying social prob-
lems as samples of human tissue may appear 
obsolete. After all, are not indeed drug addicts 
as well as psychiatric patients today recog-
nized as autonomous and responsible citizens 
who are to perform users’ choices and engage 
in respectful dialogue and must be supported 
in the conduct of their everyday life? But in 
fact, in a way, at least, that old tradition rather 
thrives from the ascent of its opposite. The con-
temporary version of a “sample”, in this case, 
would probably objectify the girl’s disease and 
at the same time subjectify her as responsible 
for dealing with it. Thus, in the current Dan-
ish discussions around how to deal with hash-
smoking, the wholistic social approach is op-
posed by a revival of drug counselling that fo-
cuses specifi cally on misuse, and in particular, 
misuse of hash. One popular form uses the tech-
nique of showing groups of youngsters graphs 
depicting how the level of THC3 in their brain 
only very slowly recedes, to explain how they 
feel and persuade them to interprete impatience 
with treatment as a well-described withdrawal 
symptom (Lundqvist & Ericsson, 1999).
Here, instead, the girl’s text is placed with-
out comment in a journalistic category of seri-
ally ordered “essays”, as the third out of fi ve 
hash-smoking girls, but among texts written by 
social workers, researchers, and offi cials (all of 
whom are offered assistance with the writing 
process by Wild Learning’s journalist).
The troubling feature about this display of 
diversity is precisely its unproblematized sub-
jectivity. As such, it reminds us of the kind of 
freak shows that swarm the media in the form 
of various social documentaries, the so-called 
“social pornography”. Like with pornography 
proper, what triggers our compassion, or repul-
sion, or both, is that we can identify directly. Dir-
ect identifi cation recognizes subjectivity, but 
manipulates it with the form of its mass media 
objectifi cation to be static, immediate and nat-
uralized (a point which was already made by 
Bertolt Brecht (1971). It is not only shockingly 
stripped, but also secretly seductive.
Thus, the reader may never even suspect 
that after all, the problems which the girl ad-
dresses are actually very traditional and most 
likely defi ned by the social workers! If we 
add material from the other 4 girls writing on 
hash on the same site and date, we have the 
following catalogue of themes: dependency; 
withdrawal; hash psychosis, memory loss and 
other side effects; relations between drug tak-
ing, drug debut and peer groups; the step-
ping-stone-hypothesis (i.e. does hash smoking 
lead on to worse drugs?); the effect on school 
performance. Such objects appear to be the 
natural environment of a hash-smoking “Girl, 
16 years”. Not exactly surprising to anyone 
already dressed in the white cloaks of health 
promotion and speaking its language.
Or the reader will be so fascinated with the 
documentary, honest naked truth format that 
she fails to refl ect the fact that precisely the 
uncommitted double talk – the story-line of “I 
wish I’d never started, because now I like it” 
– is actually almost prototypical of drug pre-
vention discourse, naturalizing the way each 
person is left alone with the ultimate paradoxes 
of self-control.
In short, the objectifi cation of subjectivity 
3  Tetra-hydro-cannabinole, the active chemical agent in 
hash.
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realizes an ideological recognition. Bearing in 
mind how ideological recognition may be the 
core of social work, for better and for worse, 
we might look at bit more closely at the work-
ings of this ideology, not only in the light of 
general discussions on themes (objects) such 
as drug use, but also in terms of the particular 
community, persons etc.
Interpellation and critique
This, then, is the profi ling of Wild Learning as 
a state-of-the-art drugs project and the state-
ment of a policy. This is one of the ways Wild 
Learning co-constructs the City’s approach 
to drugs and to wild youngsters. And, if Wild 
Learning is right in the assumption that such 
policy statements can stand the frequent trials 
of strength that appear when the social problem 
of drug-taking youngsters becomes a matter for 
media, politicians and top offi cials, then the 
girl, with her text – and the text, with its girl 
– is directly participating in reproducing the 
conditions of a powerful community.
Discussions on issues of drug use in the 
small group of young girls and social workers4 
have suddenly been turned from the inconse-
quential private as-if space of opinions and 
questions into public statements that matter. 
The same school-essay-like feature that I criti-
cized above, the way the girl is interpellated 
to assume the ideological subject-position of a 
“hash-smoking 16-years-old” by writing about 
what the social workers ask of her – this is 
also, paradoxically, what takes it out of the 
chimerical pedagogical sphere and into the real 
life of the politics of Wild Learning that uses 
the Internet to recruit and align relevant pow-
ers. This way, the girl’s participatory relation 
to Wild Learning is objectifi ed in the sense of 
becoming real.
From this point, a logic of substantializa-
tion might unfold. The author position of a 
self-determined and realistic girl is, as I hope 
I have shown, taken in itself, very superfi cial. 
By just writing anonymously and not giving 
very much of herself, she is profi ling Wild 
Learning and at the same time reproducing the 
common sense of the social work landscape 
which Wild Learning is part of.
But let us make the realistic assumption that 
this was merely a fi rst step. Embedded, as it 
is, in myriads of intertwined collectiv ities and 
activities, I have no way of guessing in which 
directions and with which artifacts the next 
steps will lead. But assuming, for the sake 
of the argument (although this assumption is 
much less realistic), that the nexts steps will 
include another Internet essay on hash-smok-
ing, we can reasonably ask: Will it be one 
of the prevailing repentence narratives with 
which youngsters are typecasted to warn their 
younger peers in the spirit of a marginalizing 
normativity hidden behind a mask of identi-
fi cation? Or will it turn around and work to 
include more of herself and more of her friends 
by forcing the Wild Learning website to con-
tain their youth subculture and even their good 
reasons for smoking hash?
The point is that both ways will change the 
policy statement of Wild Learning. Substantial-
izing the interpellation as social work means re-
alizing its mutuality. If the girl, from the point 
zero we are witnessing, is formed in a process 
where she will have to revise her uncommitted 
and naughty, yet compliant school-girl attitude, 
then Wild Learning, too, will be formed in a cri-
tique of the ideology which is displayed on the 
Internet. This way, the ideal features of Wild 
Learning as prototypical welfare state social 
work in the above circumscribed sense might 
be themselves substantialized – or is it maybe 
the idea of Wild Learning as prototypical of 
the way the welfare state is unknowingly dete-
4   The girls are anonymous and should remain so; but 
being a member of the Wild Learning network, I am 
able to guess in gross terms where they are situated 
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riorating into neoliberalism? Which will be the 
case we do not know yet.
The point is also that research plays a part 
in this critical process. This very analysis real-
izes a critique that is not only objectifi ed here, 
but also in an essay I’ve written at the same 
website. The leader of Wild Learning asked me 
to comment on the hash-smoking girls’ texts 
because he wasn’t sure about their implica-
tions and wanted a critical input with which to 
refl ect the organization’s development. I tried 
to demonstrate the constructed and framed 
nature of the girls’ truths and then provide an 
interpretation of them as instances of the social 
work of a democratized welfare state5.
Research as critical 
objectifi cation of prototypical 
practices
The notion of critique as objectifi cation, of 
course, is no news to a research community. 
The objective is that which objects, says Bruno 
Latour, or, in other words, that which resists 
trials of strength. Or, in the words of Popper, 
that which is open to, but as yet resists, falsifi -
cation. But in this case, we are not sanctioning 
some universal objectivity. The truths we are 
dealing with are ‘small’ and ethical, as Val-
verde recommends us as the proper approach to 
intoxicated autobiographies (Valverde, 2002), 
but they nevertheless carry objectivity. Even 
at this level, in the critical process, we are 
not merely communicating. We are creating 
and revising objects that we use to reconsti-
tute communities and participants who remain 
particular and unique, but who are of some 
extension and relevance6.
In the tradition of cultural-historical activity 
theory, this middle ground between the univer-
sal and the particular – the reconstruction of 
which defi es both nomothetic and idiographic 
ideas of science – can be discussed in terms 
of the prototypical, as the practical production 
of something qualitatively new which is seen 
to be feasible and relevant under certain his-
torical conditions and which realizes certain 
human potentials.
The idea of prototypes has come a long 
way since Vygotsky’s experimental-genetic 
method (Vygotsky, 1980). The leaning toward 
a modernistic and scientistic essentialism with 
which some of his followers, in east as in 
west, survived Stalinism and cold war, even 
as Marxists, sometimes led to a fetichization 
of the ideal in the shape of certain local prac-
tices which were objectifi ed as prototypes of 
the features of Humanity which were sought 
realized. The concreteness of these utopia, 
their interrelations of the abstract and the con-
crete, were handled as scientifi c experiments, 
with all the hidden assumptions that all other 
things could be equal and the context could 
be left in silence. The prototype would be 
objectifi ed as a technology, as an immutable 
mobile, numb to the particularities of the sub-
jects it represented.
The contextualizing move that countered this 
tendency, fi rst with (German and Scandinavian 
style) Critical Psychology, later with the post-
modern, poststructuralist, and situated currents, 
would mostly, not only point to the ideological 
contents of specifi c prototypes, but scrap the 
idea of a prototype altogether, leaving it behind 
as a token of the ideology of science.
However, as much as this was meant as a 
critical and democratic project – and of course, 
5   See (15.12.2003): http://www.vildelaereprocesser.dk/
kronik/kroniktekst.php3?id=103 and http://www.vilde-
laereprocesser.dk/kronik/kroniktekst.php3?id=114
6   Isabelle Stengers makes a similar point, using an example 
about knowledges on drug use, under the heading of a 
democratization of sciences (Stengers, 1999). With her 
Latourian roots she acknowledges that universality is 
problematized with democratization; but does she know 
also that she intervenes in the drugs debate on the side 
of the fashionable harm reduction discourse – and that 
so, while critical of ‘science’, she remains uncritical of 
neoliberalism?
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connected with the growing social critique of 
expertise and science in the second half of the 
20th century – in terms of empirical method-
ology, the paradoxical result was sometimes 
rather elitist. It was as if academic deconstruc-
tions of texts, and textual representations of 
“voices” or “perspectives” of participant sub-
jects, espoused in open-ended qualitative inter-
views, were quite suffi cient to realize critical 
intentions. Further, it was tacitly assumed that 
these forms of objectifi cation – incidentally, 
the ones closest to the institutions of academia 
itself – were somehow immune to ideology, so 
that their form-content (Ruben, 1978) need not 
be scrutinized and it would not be relevant to 
study the communities they helped constitute. 
They were seen in purely negative terms, as 
opening spaces of possibilities and refl ection, 
as deconstructing the given, as emancipating 
and diversifying etc.; their positivity, on the 
other hand, could be left to externalities such 
as the contingencies of academic carieers.
If we now, as I propose, to reclaim those 
positivities for critical refl ection, return to the 
idea of prototypes, but this time explicitly as 
contextualized in a social practice that recog-
nizes participants as subjects, and inseperable 
from a critique of ideology, two impending 
issues resurface.
First, the issue of the multiple relations be-
tween the social practice which is considered to 
be „prototypical“, and the objects themselves 
(the prototypes) with which that prototypical 
quality is realized (inscribed). This is far from 
simply a question of the more or less repre-
sentational qualities of artifacts like texts and 
images, even when one considers the whole 
range from raw data to academic publication. 
It is a question, also, of the ways in which those 
artifacts (and let us keep in mind that those 
identifi able with or as research are typically 
only a few among many) in their capacity as 
models become relevant to the maintenance 
or development of practices, i.e. in facilitat-
ing certain kinds of focus, in mediating certain 
simplicities7. Moreover, it is about the ways 
they may indexically defi ne those practices as 
distinct communities, and about the practical 
implications of such defi nitions – that is, how 
those artifacts, and the distinctions and focuses 
they facilitate or inforce, are used in forming 
the activities and the communities to whom 
they are relevant8. This includes, notably, the 
question of how the thus formed communities 
may relate in different ways to the participants 
they (contingently) include as subjects as well 
as to those they exclude as non-subjects – in 
a word, of the ideological functioning of the 
prototype as objectifi cation of subjectivity.
For instance, referring to Wild Learning as 
prototypical of a certain (or, indeed, uncertain) 
kind of welfare state social work opens a ques-
tion of why the “network” of Copenhagen City 
institutions should be delimited thus9, why it 
should be discussed as the “network of” this 
one of its institutions; what is gained, inhibited 
or enhanced by the analysis of policies in the 
„easily deniable“ form of a „discourse“ whose 
authorship is secondary and uncertain.
These questions are of a practical and con-
sequential nature. That is, further, not only part 
of how that Internet site works, but becomes 
also the working of research: one thing that a 
text such as this may do is make some people 
ask, im- or explicitly: „participants of the Wild 
Learning network – is that who we are?“ (in-
sofar as they actually read it). Conversely, this 
kind of questions about the practical workings 
of discourse and artifacts will not seem far-
7   To paraphrase Hegel’s rendering of the general (allge-
meinheit) in his Phenomenology (Hegel, 1988), p.72
8   This is equivalent to “framing” in Goffmann’s deep 
sense of not only “seeing or playing as”, but “doing as” 
and “being as” (Goffman, 1986)
9   The idea of a “network”, in fact, can be seen as the 
attempt to ignore the fact that any collectivity is 
 boundered and thus self-defi ning – thus, the network 
is the immediate conceptual opposite to the space, with 
its endless fabric of relations between similar points. 
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fetched from the vantage point of those „par-
ticipants of the Wild Learning network“. In 
fact, the profane and variable production of cat-
egories as fl eeting objectifi cations that work to 
subjectify and interpellate is a long tradition of 
a „cultural pedagogy“ that has taught me some 
of these ideas. One small example is the use 
of the word „wild“, with its connotations of a 
noble savage and of how excess energy and 
violations of given norms can be positive re-
sources that characterize social workers and 
youngsters alike. The hash-girls‘ internet es-
says defi ne the girls as just that: a „hash-smok-
ing girl“, but – in sharp contrast to any special-
ized drug counseling facility – only provision-
ally and superfi cially. The category has never 
been fi xed by any expertise, it does not enroll or 
align any too vital resources, and leaving it be-
hind does not imply leaving the community be-
hind. If those essays are artifacts that objectify 
prototypical everyday lives of „hash-smoking 
girls“, for all practical purposes and to all par-
ticipants the scope of their relevance is known 
to be limited and transformable.
The second resurfacing issue is just that 
of such scopes of relevance. We can begin 
to engage with this issue once we escape the 
grip of absolute scientifi c universality and its 
negative critical counterparts / mirror-images 
(multiplicity, complexity, diversity etc.). Dis-
cussing the problem of generality as one of the 
relevance(s) of a prototype leaves open a range 
of important questions which are otherwise 
often glossed over.
Thus, the implementation of ideas represent-
ed in a prototype is immediately recognized as 
problematic. It may, but in no way must, take 
the form of a copying from an industrial blue-
print. Even then, both production and use of 
copies will be obviously different from those of 
prototypes. It is no surprise, correspondingly, 
that the relations between Makarenko’s Gorkij 
Colony, his book, its mass production, its Dan-
ish translation, and the work of the Copenha-
gen social worker readers, are very far from 
understandable through the simple category of 
iden tity which underlies much methodological 
thinking10. One is faced with the many medi-
ating questions that still remain even if we as-
sume that it has already been established what 
are the relevant local dimensions, that is, when 
we have tentatively made an abstraction, and 
embarked on the arduous “ascent to the con-
crete” (Ilyenkov, 1977a; Ilyenkov, 1991).
Further, prototypes are understood to be not 
just possible, but at least in some ways desir-
able as well. Their relevance depends on some 
normative judgement. This not only connects 
back to the above issue of ideological constitu-
tion, but also urges us to reconsider the “social 
engineering” trope of realizing human poten-
tials as pertaining to the notion of scope of rele-
vance. Humanity is a level of potential gener-
ality of relevance as much as it is a set of ide-
als; it is by the generalizing reference to the hu-
manly possible that an oppressive situation can 
be criticized. But, since a prototype never fully 
detaches from the social situation in which it is 
relevant, it retains the productive and unfi nished 
tensions between the humane and the situated. 
There is no guarantee against ideological nat-
uralization, of course, but no more is there any 
intrinsic reason why a prototypical realization 
of human potentials should be reducable to it.
Scientifi c publication as 
prototypical of globalized 
discourse
This problem of generality, or scope of rele-
vance is itself “wild” in the sense that its refl ec-
tion is a never-ending process. The concrete 
10  The extreme version of that problem can be represented 
by Weick’s anecdote of the French soldiers who are 
lost in a snowstorm in the Alps, then fi nd a map which 
helps them fi nd their way back to the camp – only to be 
informed that it was a map of the Pyrannées (Weick, 
1995).
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forms it takes depend on the communities to 
which it is relevant – including, of course, 
those of science itself. Let me conclude, then, 
with a refl ection on the scope of relevance of 
the scientifi c objectifi cations that this text is 
part of.
The critical analysis I propose of the hash-
smoking girls’ essays intervenes in Wild Learn-
ing and the Copenhagen debates on drug use 
and social work. But it also intervenes in the 
ongoing debates on social work and drug use 
among those who would consider reading the 
Outlines. And there is a way in which this is 
itself potentially problematic.
As related to the discipline of social work, 
this paper connects to an international discus-
sion of what we often take to be global dis-
cursive forms such as welfare, social work, 
normativity, empowerment etc. This is true 
even of the most situated or poststructuralist 
analyses. We have a long history (in Denmark 
and in Europe) of importing ‘social work’ 
from America, probably dating back to the 
very deliberate and determined efforts of the 
Rockerfeller Foundation after WW111. But that 
does not imply that “social work” is simply the 
same in the USA as in Denmark, the United 
Kingdom, or any other European country.
What if objectifying discursive forms as 
global means not only refl ecting, but thereby 
actually reproducing neoliberal globalism? 
What if that which we need to address should 
be the specifi cs of the Danish welfare state, 
at the turn of the millennium, and as part of 
the EU and the New World Order in a unique 
way – just as we obviously must address the 
specifi cs of Ukraine in the fi rst Soviet years if 
we are to understand Makarenko?
Currently, it seems to me that we may be 
in the process of forgetting the specifi cally 
Nordic form of welfare state universalism. It 
is true that ever since World War 2 the human 
social rights discourse of Beveridge and Mar-
shall have permeated political language. This 
corresponded in Denmark with an important 
change. Before the war, Danish welfare was 
largely organized as state support for coopera-
tive self-help in the social classes, e.g. subsi-
dizing the small farmers’ or the workers’ health 
insurance etc. (although these were never, as 
in Germany, directly related to employment). 
After the war, all of these organizations were 
gradually taken over by the state. But univer-
salism, before and after, was never conceived 
only as the abstract civil right of the naked 
human being; rather, it was the argument for 
building a just society through state institutions 
for all: health system, schools, pensions, kin-
dergartens, nursery schools, institutions for old 
people – these were not to help the poor who 
couldn’t manage themselves, yet who still had 
this universal social right, but because this was 
the way of a modern “human society”.
This kind of universalism was probably the 
result both of strong labour movements and the 
position of the Nordic countries as frontline 
states in the cold war. After the Americans 
withdrew from fi nancially securing Western 
Europe with the Nixon doctrine, with the sub-
sequent recession, and with the fall of the great 
industry in Europe, and of course, after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, the Nordic welfare states 
are gradually retreating, and with them, their 
proponents gradually begin to speak in terms 
of abstract humanism.
When I adopt, as I do above, the analyses 
of Philp, Stenson, Rose and other British writ-
ers on the theme of social work – or those of 
Donzelot in France or Cruikshank in America 
– I need to be just as careful with transfer as 
when I use Makarenko. This is true of the 
11  About this historical reconstruction, see (Bernild, 1999; 
Bernild, 2003; Buus, 2001; Højrup, 2003a; Højrup, 
2003b; Jensen, 2003). The analyses are largely derived 
from a collective research project on the “Welfare state 
at a cross-roads”. See www.hum.ku.dk/lov – signifi can-
tly, though, almost all of this material is in Danish, but 
it may give some impression of the interdisciplinary 
project on the history and culture of the Danish welfare 
state.
43857_outlines 2004 nr1.indd   86 04-11-2004   15:22:30
Outlines • No. 1 • 2004
87
distance in time as well as in space. Philp em-
phasizes abstract humanism and the relation 
of society toward the socially excluded; Rose, 
at the other end of the Thatcher regime (but 
referring to Deleuze) proclaims the death of 
the social. Philp is still critical, whereas Rose 
seems content with description.
When I try to emphasize how humanism 
may be concretized in social work, not only 
in the American form where empowerment 
means self-responsibility, but by the mutual-
ity of reconstituting society and individuals, 
and when I refuse to accept the death of the 
social or the retreat from ideology critique to 
academic discourse analysis – maybe that is 
not only the result of a certain theoretical ap-
proach (which still carries the name ‘critical 
psychology’), but also of the specifi c needs 
of a Nordic theorizing of social work in the 
welfare state.
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